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a b s t r a c t 
Traditional wisdom in economics holds that institutional change runs from political institutions 
to economic ones, with the distribution of political power aﬀecting the creation of property rights 
and rule of law. This hierarchy of institutions has been observed in macroeconomic policy, where 
it has long been understood that there are political incentives for economic mismanagement, 
namely the creation of inﬂation. But are there longer-term eﬀects of currency manipulation on 
the rule of law in a country? That is, does the hierarchy not always hold? This paper answers this 
question by focusing on a speciﬁc case of monetary instability, the newly-independent Second 
Polish Republic of 1918 to 1939. Using appropriate econometric techniques on a new database of 
historical data, I ﬁnd that monetary proﬂigacy correlates strongly with signiﬁcantly lower levels 
of the rule of law. This result is robust to several tests and most speciﬁcations, including the use 
of a new variable for measuring access to the political system. The results suggest that monetary 
instability is a threat to political institutions in its own right, eroding the rule of law in addition 
to creating macroeconomic diﬃculties. 
© 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “The best way to destroy the capitalist system is to debauch the currency. ”
– attributed to V.I. Lenin by J.M. Keynes, 1919 
1. Introduction 
The economic wisdom of the past three decades has downplayed the role of economic institutions in economic outcomes, focusing
instead on the role that political institutions play in determining broader economic outcomes. This approach, termed a “hierarchy of
institutions ” by Acemoglu et al. (2005) and further advanced in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , argues that the distribution of political
power aﬀects the creation of property rights and rule of law, which, in turn, have been shown to mediate economic results (a ﬁnding
echoed by Flachaire et al., 2014 ). Acemoglu et al. (2005) further formalize this hierarchy into a model of institutional inﬂuence,
arguing that the distribution of resources and the distribution of power (likely, but not necessarily, linked) have the predominant
eﬀect on a country’s growth path precisely through their eﬀect on economic institutions such as property rights. 
There are numerous examples of how this hierarchy works in practice, showing where political institutions inﬂuence eco- 
nomic outcomes. In particular, money, as a unit of value or a method of exchange, has been subjected to political manipu-
lation for centuries, leading to the development of an entire economics literature related to issues of “dynamic inconsistency ”∗ Correspondence to: Department of Accounting, Finance & Economics, Bournemouth University Business School, Fern Barrow, Poole, Dorset, 
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 ( Kydland and Prescott, 1977 ); most prominently, the literature on central bank independence (CBI, as shown in Cukierman et al.
(1992) and continued by many papers since) has attempted to show how proper institutional arrangements could, in certain circum-
stances, mitigate political incentives for monetary manipulation. 
However, the wrinkle in this vast literature is that while it reveals the channels in which political institutions may inﬂuence
economic institutions, it does not necessarily consider that the relationship can run in both directions over a short time frame. Within
the hierarchy, there is an acknowledgement that economic institutions may inﬂuence political ones in the long term, as a country’s
distribution of power may be changed by shifts in “the relative bargaining power of rulers versus constituents (or rulers versus rulers)
… [or] major, persistent changes in relative prices ” ( North, 1984 :260). Acemoglu et al. (2005 , among others) ﬁnd that political
institutions are slow-moving and diﬃcult to change, as “political institutions as a means of allocating political power… regulate the 
future allocation of political power ” ( Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005 :24). But while this reality is plausible in times of normal political
processes and in the absence of external threats, this assertion can be challenged during severe economic disruptions. Extreme 
behaviour by economic institutions, either during or in precipitating a crisis, may, in turn, disrupt or determine political institutions
and their subsequent paths, quickly altering the status quo in a destabilizing manner. Crisis periods, episodes of hyperinﬂation,
and invasion all have the ability to force changes in power distributions across society and thus alter political institutions as well.
Even more “normal ” economic disruptions may change bargaining strategies and political coalitions, leaving a country’s political 
institutions transformed. 
The reborn Second Polish Republic, existing from 1918 to 1939, appears to be a key example of the inﬂuence of economic
institutions on political institutional formation. Unlike modern theories of monetary policy, which focus on the need for independence 
from political pressure, the experience of Poland seems to show instead that monetary institutions had a direct and deleterious
impact on nascent political ones. Many researchers have argued a similar thesis regarding Poland’s large western neighbour during 
the interwar period —namely, that hyperinﬂation weakened the Weimar Republic ( Hill et al., 1977 ) and led to the rise of the Nazis,
who promised economic stability ( van Riel and Schram, 1993 ). But despite the attention that Germany has received in the historical,
political science, and economics literature, little attention has gone to Poland, which also saw both high inﬂation and a rapid decline
in the rule of law. 
In the Polish case, the hyperinﬂation of the early 1920s, in particular, and the seeming political impotence in ﬁghting it, led to
a more authoritarian-minded government coming to power in 1926. This government, the Sanacja (sanitizing) regime, progressively 
eroded the rule of law until Poland became a proto-fascist state on the eve of its dual invasion by Germany and Soviet Russia. And
throughout the interwar period, Poland uniformly saw episodes of the degradation of the rule of law preceded by massive bouts of
monetary instability. 
The purpose of this paper is thus to revisit the “hierarchy of institutions ” debate, tracing the eﬀect of monetary policy in Poland
in the interwar period. Assembling a new dataset of historical data on a monthly basis, tracing the development of macroeconomic
and institutional aggregates in Poland and the rest of Central Europe, and using a new measure of rule of law, this paper attempts to
formally model the relationship between monetary policy and rule of law econometrically. Extending the literature on institutional 
endogeneity, the key result of the paper is that there is a consistent, small, but highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of monetary policy on the rule
of law in the Second Republic. This result is robust to various speciﬁcations, endogeneity, and diﬀerent proxies of proﬂigate monetary
policy, and holds even after accounting for a large number of covariates, which could plausibly be related to the development of a
rules-based political system. While political attributes are still important for the development of Poland’s political institutions, across 
the board, economic conditions and institutions appear to have had a much larger eﬀect. 
2. Monetary policy and the rule of law: the link 
As the quote attributed to Lenin ( White and Schuler, 2009 ) at the beginning of this paper makes clear, the relationship of money
to the functioning of political and other economic institutions is not a new idea; in fact, it has appeared throughout the past two
centuries in various works on political economy. However, much of the theoretical and empirical research in modern economics 
literature has inverted this research question, focusing instead on the eﬀect that rule of law or overall institutional quality has on
monetary policy or the design of monetary policy institutions ( Mishkin, 1999 ; Fatás and Mihov, 2013 ). Driven by attempts to isolate
the determinants of short-term macroeconomic outcomes (growth or inﬂation), this literature has tended to assume that a country’s 
level of rule of law is exogenously given rather than endogenously determined over short time frames (for a recent example, see
Calderón et al., 2016 , who examine institutions and macroeconomic policies from 1984–2008). The empirical results from these 
studies show that monetary institutions and their outcomes depend upon the rule of law to function properly (e.g. Eijﬃnger and
Stadhouders, 2003 ). Much of the literature on central bank independence is formed around the assumption that monetary policy
institutions are a derivation of political institutions (even if it is not explicitly stated), and thus central banks need to be insulated
from political pressure via independence, whether legal or operational. 
Left unspoken in the prevailing literature is how these monetary policy institutions, and the policies they then pursue, would
translate into political institutional changes. It is highly likely, if not certain, that monetary policy at time t does not only aﬀect other
macroeconomic aggregates at times t through t + n but would also inﬂuence political institutional development during this same time
frame and beyond. For example, over the long term, monetary policy can have a direct and profound eﬀect on the distribution of
power in a country ( Woolley, 1985; Argitis and Pitelis, 2001 ), which then ﬁlters through to that country’s political structures. This
inﬂuence is especially relevant under the assumption of central bank independence, where the economic institution of the central 
bank is theorized to be explicitly insulated from the political institutions of the government. If, instead, causality runs in the other
direction, the eﬀects from an independent monetary authority’s actions, unconstrained by political considerations, could be quite large 38 
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 on the political institutions it resides among. Monetary policies do not need to have such a direct eﬀect, however, as poor monetary
policy may also send important signals about the prevailing institutional structure and its inability to function. Such a prolonged
mismanagement of the currency could have sudden and unpredictable eﬀects, leading to (sometimes radical) institutional change. 
Even over a short period of time, the exogeneity of political institutions cannot be plausibly assumed, as changing macroeconomic
conditions create diﬀerent electoral strategies, diﬀerent political coalitions, and diﬀerent political approaches to economic policy. In 
times of severe economic distress, as during the Great Depression or more recently during the Global Financial Crisis, governments
may aggregate powers to themselves that were previously unheard of during times of economic growth. This aggregation of economic
powers may also lead to an expansion of political powers as well, altering the path of both political institutions (rule of law) and
monetary policy for the future. As Andrews and Montinola (2004) note, the reduction of veto players in an economic system makes
for speciﬁc policy paths, especially in the monetary realm, so that previous monetary policies, by inﬂuencing the political system,
could set the course for future monetary policy. 
Despite this theoretical basis, the relationship of monetary policy on political development has thus far been explored mainly
in political science, sociology, and heterodox schools of economics. Both Neo-Mengerian (Austrian) and post-Keynesian approaches, 
reasoning from nearly the same analytical basis, note that money is an endogenous construct within a system, and as such is also a
political institution unto itself. While the two heterodox schools diverge in their prescriptions on how monetary authorities should
act, both schools of thought identify the institutional structure of central banking and its modern practice as threats to rule of law
(see Canova, 2009 for the post-Keynesian argument and White, 2010 for the Austrian one). 1 From a post-Keynesian perspective, 
the conduct of monetary policy without explicit oversight from political institutions creates imbalance in the political system and
allows one political authority, the one controlling the money supply, to impose its own desires upon the political system and bypass
democratic legitimacy ( Arestis and Bain, 1995 ). In this manner, the rule of law is replaced by a ﬁnancial elite. On the other side,
Austrians argue that the use of money for policy objectives means concentrating discretion in the hands of a few and allows for
arbitrary transfers among segments of the population. As Hanke (2003 :133) notes, the use of policy to advantage or disadvantage
segments of the population means that property rights are never truly protected, and thus “governments that fail to protect the value
of their money are guilty of not abiding by the rule of law. ”
Despite the long history of theorizing the relationship between monetary policy and rule of law, only recently has there been a
more mainstream attempt to develop a theory (with corresponding empirics) regarding the inﬂuence of monetary policy on a country’s
institutional make-up. One of the early mainstream papers to touch upon this idea was Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2004) , who noted that tight
monetary policy could aﬀect the rule of law; using the example of Russia in the 1990s, they asserted that any policy that decreases
credit availability hampers long-term time horizons and thus the rule of law. 
Much more comprehensive than this early paper is a recent work from Koyama and Johnson (2015) , who argue that loose monetary
policy is far more destructive to country-level institutions. Drawing on a panel dataset of 143 countries but over a short and recent
timespan (from 1996 to 2011), Koyama and Johnson ﬁnd a strong negative relationship between rule of law and inﬂation, concluding
that monetary instability does in fact erode the rule of law. They speculate that there are two separate avenues through which monetary
proﬂigacy could have this eﬀect: 
1. Monetary instability favors speciﬁc segments of society (debtors) over others (savers), creating incentives for non-market activities . This
political decision on who wins and who loses in society would naturally create groups with a vested interest in seeing such policies
continued. Under such an eventuality, politicians would be willing to work to the advantage of these groups and keep such policies
in place (advantaging short-term gains over long-term sustainability). The longer-term eﬀect of such policies would also be, as
Koyama and Johnson (2015) note, to reduce the political power of the middle class, further stratifying society and impacting
institutional development. 
2. Monetary crises create their own terrible solutions. Monetary crises, begun as a politically-motivated decision to manipulate economic 
aggregates, tend to encourage interventionism, aggregation of powers to the executive, and additional measures which transfer 
power from the market to the government; Koyama and Johnson (2015) mention price and wage controls, as well as noting that
the panic which sustained monetary proﬂigacy can engender could lead to the creation of a number of measures that would never
be accepted in normal economic times. As President Obama’s former Chief of Staﬀ Rahm Emanuel said, “you never let a good
crisis go to waste. ”2 The issue for rule of law is that this is precisely what would come to pass. 
In addition to these potential channels of inﬂuence, a third one must be noted, especially relevant for countries in a state of
ﬂux. In newly-independent or transition economies, the entire institutional environment is evolving simultaneously, as the lack of 
institutional memory means that the economic system is continuously adjusting to new information, new actors, and, oftentimes, new
patterns of production and trade. In this environment, it is crucial for institutions to receive the appropriate signals for their evolution,
as the path-dependency of institutional change means that a new path can be moved towards quite easily; as Koppl (2006 :235) notes,
“institutions generally work best when they are governed by relatively simple rules rather than discretion, ” and such discretion
can cause chaos at the initial stages of institutional genesis. With monetary institutions overwhelming the price mechanism and
encouraging non-market activities, the institutions that will be created in this environment will not be those that facilitate a market1 The divergence in prescriptions is pronounced, as Neo-Mengerians prefer to eliminate the central bank and move towards free banking, while 
post-Keynesians wish to eliminate the independence of the central bank and bring its mandate in line with broader economic policy goals and 
interventions. 
2 Spoken at the Wall Street Journal CEO Council in Washington, DC, on November 9, 2008. Video of his talk, including this quote, can be found 
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = _mzcbXi1Tkk . 
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 economy, but rather those that are created in an atmosphere of distortions. This applies not only to economic institutions but also
to political ones, especially in a situation where the new political authorities have no experience in dealing with the needs of a
free market. In an atmosphere of monetary proﬂigacy, it is highly likely that the rule of law, based as it is on predictability and
impartiality, would be aﬀected. 
This combination of mixed signals and institutional evolution can be exacerbated by the political institutions themselves, especially 
when democracy, allowing for free and open elections, is evolving alongside nascent economic institutions. Under a democratic 
regime, voters have the ability to correct for poor economic policy, whether perceived or real, and can act through the ballot box to
correct past monetary proﬂigacy. However, the manner in which society acts may not necessarily be in the best interest of institutional
development for the longer term, especially in regard to economic institutions. 3 
This reality may be illustrated with a simple median voter model. 4 In the ﬁrst instance, it is helpful to assume that the income
distribution of the economy mediates the response of society to inﬂationary outcomes; this is not a new observation, as noted above,
as savers and laborers (generally poorer) should be inﬂation averse (inﬂation acting as a tax on their wages and savings, especially
if they were not indexed), but politicians, borrowers, and holders of assets like land (i.e. those likely to be wealthier, see Robinson,
1979 ) might favour looser monetary policies. Inﬂation outcomes would then be determined by the relative size of each group: in an
economy that is more agrarian, or where the inﬂation averse outnumber the inﬂation seeking, the median voter is likely to also be
more inﬂation averse. Or, as Przeworski and Limongi (1993 :53) note in the context of incomes, “if the median voter is decisive and
if the market-generated distribution of income is skewed downward, as it always is, the majority equilibrium (if one exists) will call
for a greater equality. ”
In such a situation, where inﬂation-averse voters are relatively abundant, there is no guarantee that inﬂation will not occur, as
politicians still follow their own incentives (the famous dynamic inconsistency problem of Kydland and Prescott, 1977 ). However, 
when inﬂation, especially at very high levels, does occur, the median voter would likely vote for the party which promised stability,
as it would stop the taxation of the poorer segments of society. In an atmosphere where the party system was not developed or was,
itself, chaotic, the median voter might then gravitate towards strong personalities that could deliver this stability. Unfortunately, in
an environment in ﬂux, leaders brought in under such circumstances would likely not limit themselves to monetary stability, but
to broader worries about economic and political instability in the country. The ramiﬁcations of this assumption regarding stability
would be a greater concentration of power in the executive as a way to both project conﬁdence to the voters and to control potential
sources of instability in the country. Both of these trends would, in the longer term, lead to an erosion of rule of law. 
3. Monetary policy and political change in interwar Poland 5 
This was precisely the case with the new Second Republic of Poland. Having disappeared from the map of Europe via the Partitions
and having been governed by three diﬀering approaches to economic policy over 123 years (corresponding to its three occupying
empires —Prussia/Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary), Poland was without hands-on knowledge of basic modern economic in- 
stitutions in 1918. 
Paramount among these institutions was a central bank, an institution that was of no importance in Warsaw when monetary policy
was controlled in Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna. Perhaps fortuitously, however, German occupiers had established the “Polish 
National Credit Bank ” ( Polska Krajowa Kasa Po ż yczkowa, or PKKP) in December 1916 on the Polish territory, giving it a mandate to
issue local currency (the Polish Mark) at parity with German Marks. Following independence, the interim government ordered the 
PKKP to continue as the bank of sole issuance; however, the challenge of building a modern monetary authority, already diﬃcult
in a post-conﬂict setting and with little administrative capacity, 6 was compounded by the fact that at least ﬁve separate currencies
were operating on Polish soil ( Wolf, 2005 ). 7 With the Polish Mark the only currency that the government in Warsaw could control,
it was slowly introduced as a parallel currency wherever it was not already in circulation. Concurrently, the four other currencies
used across the Republic were gradually withdrawn by the central authorities, a process that was completed by early 1920 ( Landau,
1990 ). 
Unfortunately, this success was short-lived, as the Second Republic faced continuous conﬂict in the early 1920s, beginning with
a brief war with Ukraine in 1919 which then developed into a prolonged conﬂict with the Soviet Union. The Russo-Polish war also
created massive ﬁscal problems, and, in order to ﬁnance the conﬂict, the new Polish government followed the experience of other
countries in the region and resorted to proﬂigate monetary policy to ﬁnance its spending. This led to predictable consequences:
as Wolf (2005 :417), quoting Zdziechowski (1925) , notes, “the money supply increased between 1918 and 1919 by 519%, in the
following year by another 929%, to reach in 1923 more than 12,000,000% (!) of the level in 1918. ”
Even after the Treaty of Riga ended the war in March 1921, the government continued to use seignorage to ﬁnance new spending
( Sargent, 1982 ). From 1921 and 1922, the number of notes in circulation increased by 316% (in 1921) and a further 231% in3 Hartwell (2013) makes this point in transition, as data shows that stronger legislatures early in the transition process slowed the growth of 
economic institutions, mainly due to a proclivity to redistribute income which then stiﬂed incentives for market operators. 
4 Thanks to Harald Uhlig for suggesting this framework. 
5 The historical retelling of this section is based on Hartwell (2016) . 
6 This problem was exacerbated by the interim Polish government, who, upon independence, decided immediately to replace all German staﬀ of 
the central monetary authority with Poles. 
7 As Wolf (2005) notes, these currencies were, in addition to the Polish Mark, the German Mark, the Austrian Crown, the Russian Ruble, and the 
‘‘Ost-Rubel ’’ on the territory of ‘‘Ober Ost, ” which included Lithuania and Bia ł ystok-Grodno. 
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 1922, leading to an increase of over 100% in the wholesale price index in just four months in 1922 (July to October). Creating a
constituency in the growing industrial sector, which saw an implicit state subsidy in the form of continually falling export prices
( Landau and Tomaszewski, 1984 ), the wholesale price index ballooned to an unlikely 248,426.60 (with 1914 as the base) from a
manageable 32.88 in March 1920 (based on Sargent, 1982 ). 
The hyperinﬂation was only broken with the creation of a new currency and a new central bank. The z ł oty was introduced as
legal tender in 1924, backed by a reserve of gold and major foreign currencies ( Sargent, 1982 ). The new institution to oversee this
currency, Bank Polski, was modelled on the Bank of England and, foreshadowing the debates on central bank independence ﬁfty
years later, was set up as a joint stock company in order to retain some autonomy from the Polish government in setting monetary
policy ( Landau and Tomaszewski, 1984 ). 
Prices began to stabilize immediately as the amount of money in circulation dropped dramatically, with money supplies levelling
oﬀ by January 1925. But even with hyperinﬂation defeated, inﬂation remained very high in the following ﬁve years (approximately
16% annually) and employment levels struggled to recover, as ﬁrms which had beneﬁted from the inﬂationary subsidy went bankrupt
following stabilization. Similarly, the nascent Polish banking sector underwent a massive crisis in 1925 once the monetary stimulus
of the previous years ended ( Morawski, 2008 ), a situation exacerbated by the easy money regime, which created banks with low
levels of capital reserves, excessive staﬀ and administration, and inﬂated costs of administration ( Taylor, 1926 ). 
Exhausted by years of subpar governance and economic results, Polish Marshal Josef Pi ł sudski, a hero of the Russo-Polish war
and Chief of State from 1918 to 1922, led a coup that overthrew the elected government in 1926. 8 The new regime, named “Sanacja ”
(literally “sanitation, ” signifying a cleansing of the body politic), was meant to curb the weakness of the previous revolving-door
governments by centralizing power in the oﬃce of the executive and curtailing the Sejm (Polish parliament). 9 The new regime also
codiﬁed its newfound authority in a new Constitution in August 1926, giving the President the right to dissolve the Sejm and to pass
resolutions with the force of legislation ( Kowalski, 2014 ). 
With the new “Sanitation ” regime in place, one of the moves undertaken by the government to ensure economic stability was
a switch to a full gold standard in late 1927. While Wolf (2007 :359) notes that “Polish monetary policy apparently hinged to a
large degree on the strategic considerations of the regime, ” the dependence of the regime on foreign investment also meant that
monetary stability equaled investment, which equaled political stability. In this sense, the hardening of the currency was a way for
the unconstrained executive to wrest back monetary stability so that it would no longer threaten the regime. 10 However, the eﬀects
of monetary instability in the early 1920s continued to linger, as the price level in Poland in 1935 was only slightly below that of
1929, meaning that the excess liquidity and artiﬁcial price inﬂation that had been injected into the system by the hyperinﬂation still
had not been wrung out by the new monetary regime. 
More importantly, the possible long-term beneﬁts of disinﬂation for Poland (including perhaps for the rule of law) had little chance
to accrue, as Poland left the gold standard in April 1936. This monetary decision was exogenously conditioned by the coming end of
the “gold bloc, ” but was also spurred on by the desire to undertake massive ﬁscal stimulus (mainly military spending) in a tight ﬁscal
environment ( Wolf, 2008 ). 11 Indeed, in pursuit of this ﬁscal goal, upon leaving the bloc, the Polish government began (slowly at ﬁrst
but in a much more accelerated manner in 1938) to re-inﬂate the z ł oty , quickly abandoning the rectitude that characterized the gold
standard years. Concurrently, the regime expanded its powers even further: in the economic sphere, the regime instituted exchange 
and capital controls in 1936, with additional and more stringent ones introduced throughout 1937 and 1938, while in the political
sphere, a new, proto-fascist Constitution was introduced one year prior to Poland exiting the gold standard in April 1935. 12 With the
death of Pi ł sudski in May 1935, and without the force of his personality, political instability returned as his successors wasted energy
on maneuvers to assume the presidency ( Haczy ń ski, 1975 ). But regardless of who was in power, the damage to the institution of rule
of law in Poland had already been done. 
4. Data and estimation 
4.1. Data and identiﬁcation strategy 
In order to test econometrically the relationship between rule of law and monetary policy in interwar Poland, I have compiled a
new monthly dataset of economic conditions in the Polish Republic from December 1918 to August 1939. As in all economic history,
the paucity of historical data makes econometric estimation susceptible to omitted, underlying variables driving the results. However, 8 The designation “chief of state ” ( Naczelnik Pa ń stwa ) was used only for Pi ł sudski, as the powers of this post were transitioned to the President 
upon the end of Pi ł sudski’s term in December 1922. 
9 In fact, the Sejm sanctioned this transfer of powers, oﬀering Pi ł sudski the oﬃce of President after the coup, an oﬀer he declined in favor of his 
protégé, Ignacy Mo ś cicki ( Lerski 1996 ). 
10 The monetary reforms in 1924 were a ﬁrst attempt at imposing stability, as the stabilization package tied the z ł oty to the Swiss franc (which 
itself was backed by gold), as well as other foreign currencies. But while there was a proxy gold standard in place as a result of this reform, monetary 
discretion still prevailed for another three years. 
11 Great Britain left the gold standard in 1931 and the US in 1933, Italy in 1934, and Belgium in 1935. France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland 
remained until the end, exiting the gold bloc in early October 1936. 
12 While the 1935 Constitution did not explicitly create a fascist state, it eliminated all checks and balances on the executive, brought the judiciary 
under the control of the executive, extended the term of the President to seven years (with no term limits), and, most notably, in Article 7 noted 
that “the state was to be an organizer of public life. ”
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 while the scarcity of high-frequency data from the inter-war period is problematic, enough data was available across disparate sources
(many never before compiled in a database) to allow for the development of an identiﬁcation strategy in examining our thesis. In
particular, macroeconomic and monetary data were assembled from the League of Nations Monthly Statistical Bulletin , the Global
Financial Database, the German Statistiches Jahrbuch from various years , and Polish sources, while political data and estimations of
the rule of law are derived from both existing and brand-new datasets or were created based on the political history of Poland (see
Data Appendix). 
As the proxy for rule of law, I utilize a new indicator for access to the political system, that of “regime value ” taken from the
“MaxRange ” dataset. Compiled by researchers at Halmstad University in Sweden and covering political institutions and regime types 
on a monthly basis from 1789 to the present day ( Rånge and Sandberg, 2017 ), this dataset oﬀers a new way to conceptualize the extent
of democratic access to the political system. The regime value measure used here allows for ﬁne gradations in the type of political
institutions that exist in a country; coded from 0 to 100, with higher numbers representing more democratic access, the regime value
variable encapsulates the checks and balances within a system, particular institutional arrangements, and political competition (the 
complete coding and corresponding regime type is shown in Appendix A ). 
The composite index for “regime value ” contains within it four sub-variables, including regime type, accountability structure, 
executive strength, and whether a regime is “normal ” or “interim. ” These sub-variables are then further delineated into indexes; for
example, as noted in Rånge and Sandberg (2017 :506–507), there are seven speciﬁc main components of the “regime type ” indicator:
1. Territorial control : if a government has functional control over the vast majority (deﬁned here as of at least 67%) of a country’s
territory; 
2. Political competition : the existence of at least two “serious and competing political alternatives in national elections; ”
3. Freedom of speech, media, and assembly ; 
4. Electoral integrity and quality : “Candidates must not be subject to intimidation, repression, or major obstruction. In addition, voters
are entitled to secrecy and the absence of systematic electoral fraud; ”
5. Constitutional consensus/legitimacy : presence of an established constitution which preserves minority protections but also the ac- 
knowledgement by the minority of the majority’s right to rule (in practice); 
6. General suﬀrage: widespread right to vote; and 
7. Constitutional order: executives “must not violate an established constitutional order, such as the separation of executive, legisla- 
tive, and judiciary authorities. Furthermore, a government or executive cannot make decisions without a proper constitutional 
amendment or parliamentary approval. ”
Similarly, executive strength can be thought of as a continuum of seven classiﬁcations, including absolute, overwhelming, domi- 
nating, signiﬁcant, constitutional, weak, undeﬁned, and martial law. 
The overall regime value indicator is calculated by ﬁrst weighting each of the classiﬁcations within each sub-variable and collating
the total (i.e. adding up the scores for regime type under the order of importance as shown above), and then adding the four sub-
variables together (also weighted by order of importance, i.e. with regime type and accountability having the highest weight). 
The broad-based nature of this variable, with its emphasis on several diﬀerent facets of democratic accountability, makes it an
excellent proxy for the political institutions of interwar Poland and, in particular, the rule of law. Moreover, the indicator shows
substantial variation across the over 20 years ’ worth of monthly data in Poland assembled here; as Fig. 1 shows, Poland lurched from
an intermediate elected interim government to a qualiﬁed democracy (the highest score possible) and then fell to absolute governance
before rebounding to a military parliamentary system and ﬁnally a hierarchical military-dominated parliamentary system. These 42 
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Fig. 2. Log of monetary policy indicators, 1919 to 1939. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 changes, even though they may be slow-moving and discrete (which will be corrected for in the choice of estimator, shown below),
oﬀer an opportunity to test our hypothesis econometrically. 
For the key independent variable of interest, monetary policy, several variables are used as proxies for monetary (in)stability in
the interwar period. In particular, the empirical examination below will utilize the Producer Price Index (PPI) as the main proxy for
monetary policy to capture pass-through inﬂation at the wholesale level before it reaches consumers. Additionally, as a control, I
will use the USD/z ł oty (or mark) exchange rate, which may be impacted by poor monetary policy even more quickly than producer
prices. Finally, as an additional control, a dichotomous variable for monetary policy similar to that of Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and
Conover et al. (1999) will be used, taking the value of 1 if monetary policy was tightened in the past month and 0 if it was not. The
underlying series to determine this monetary policy stance in interwar Poland is the stock of currency in circulation, a variable which
was utilized as the key monetary policy instrument by both the PKKP from 1918 to 1924 and Bank Polski from 1924 onward. 13 Given
the reality that monetary policy was not necessarily a month-to-month strategy (although some evidence of interwar Poland says that
this indeed was the case), I also use a quarterly dummy for monetary tightening, with a month being coded as 1 if the previous three
months showed a decline in the amount of currency in circulation. 14 
These variables have several salutary aspects, not least that they have an unbroken series spanning the entire interwar period (the
exchange rate was originally missing some months immediately following the currency reform in 1924 but was obtained by hand,
see Data Appendix). As von Thadden (1995) also notes, each of these indicators tended to track the other, especially in the early
years of the Second Republic, and plotting out the entire series of the PPI and exchange rate variables shows that this is indeed the
case ( Fig. 2 , with indicators log-transformed to reduce vast discrepancies in scale). But while the hyperinﬂation tends to make all
changes in the post-1924 period appear minor, the period after the currency reform in 1924 was anything but mild, as Fig. 3 shows.13 Monetary emissions are explicitly referred to in the Bank’s operating statute in reference to the zloty’s relationship to gold prices and reserve 
requirements of the Bank. See Statut Banku Polskiego (jako za łącznik do rozporz ądzenia prezydenta z 20 stycznia 1924 r) [Statute of the Bank of Poland 
(an annex to the Presidential Decree of 20 January 1924). An interesting insight and critical analysis of this facet of the Bank Polski (among many 
others) is given in Buczkowski (1927) . 
14 An anonymous referee suggested that perhaps interest rates could also be used as an indicator of monetary policy, but this is unfortunately not 
the case in interwar Poland. In the ﬁrst instance, the PKKP and later Bank Polski conducted monetary policy by targeting the money supply, not by 
using the interest rate. Secondly, as a relatively small open economy, especially during the gold standard years, Poland was an interest rate-taker 
and not an interest rate-maker, subjected to global interest rate ﬂuctuations. Finally, while spreads on interest rates may be indicative of monetary 
policy issues, such a blunt approach would more likely encompass political risk in Poland as well; that is, interest rate spreads would be another 
proxy for the left-hand variable (changes in rule of law) rather than the right-hand variable of interest (monetary policy). For these reasons, other 
indicators as noted above were utilized. 
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 Moreover, taking a quick look at the data ( Figs. 4–7 ), it appears that there is a strong correlation between changes in these monetary
variables and the regime value. 
Given the apparent correlation between monetary policy and rule of law in interwar Poland, the next stage is to formally model
the relationship. A sign-restricted vector autoregression (VAR) similar to that of Uhlig (2005) is often utilized to model the eﬀects of
changes in monetary policy on various outcome variables. This approach derives the impact of (sign-restricted) shocks with as little
use of theorizing as possible in reference to the variable of interest. 
However, a VAR framework is not appropriate for use in this examination due precisely to this atheoretical nature. In the literature,
VARs are used almost exclusively with macroeconomic outcomes, where information about future responses of macroeconomic 
variables to a policy shock may be gleaned from information embodied in lags of these variables (and how the variables have related44 
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 to each other in the past). While papers may use institutional shocks on the right-hand side (see, for example, Góes (2016) , who uses
institutional shocks to trace out changes in GDP, or Wells and Wills (2000) , who examine the eﬀect of political changes on stock
prices in 17th century England), there exists, to my knowledge, no such papers that use an institutional variable as the Y variable in
a VAR setting with macroeconomic and other institutional proxies as X variables. 15 This omission from the economics literature is
likely because institutional changes are not simply a function of prior institutions and exclusively macroeconomic policies, and thus
are not captured well in a VAR. In particular, in an environment of institutional change, the relationship between a policy shock and15 Exceptions to this come from the political science literature, but there is tendency to use solely institutions and policies within a VAR framework 
rather than mixing macroeconomic variables and institutional indicators. See, for example, Krause (1996) , who examines the eﬀects of various 
institutions of the US government on each other in a dynamic administrative model. Krause’s VAR models each institution’s behavior as a function 
of other institutions and its own past information; beyond restricting the analysis to the eﬀects of institutions on each other, his model also notably 
focuses on a highly stable institutional system, something that cannot be said about Poland in the interwar period. 
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 that particular institution will not only be a function of prior responses, as an institutional response may (and indeed, should) diﬀer
due to the current form and composition of the institution. 
This reality is ampliﬁed in an institutional setting where many institutions are in ﬂux, such as in a country returning to inde-
pendence for the ﬁrst time in 123 years; in such an environment, prior relationships among economic, political, and institutional
variables may no longer hold, nor may they provide pertinent information for the future understanding of shocks. A theory of insti-
tutional change and the feedback between institutions and macroeconomic variables would then be necessary to understand their 
relationship, allowing us to “separate endogenous and exogenous components of variance in policy variables by careful historical 
analysis ” ( Sims, 1980 :12). The lack of such a theory in a VAR, and its reliance on past relationships, makes understanding the eﬀects
of macroeconomic policies on institutions incredibly diﬃcult both economically and econometrically. 16 
Rather than use an agnostic VAR approach, but instead building oﬀ of both the previous literature and recent advances in time-
series modeling, the identiﬁcation strategy used here follows in the spirit of Tabellini (2010) , fashioning a theory on the broader
economic determinants of the rule of law, encompassing as many plausible covariates as possible which ﬁt the theory. Such a model
would take the econometric form of: 
ln 
(
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑉 𝑎𝑙𝑢 𝑒 𝑡 
)
= 𝛼𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑃 𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑦 𝑡 −1 + 𝛽𝑋 𝑡 −1 + 𝜀 𝑡 (3) 
Where Y is the MaxRange regime value variable, Monetary Policy is one of the three proxies noted above, lagged one month, and X ’
represents the comprehensive vector of controls which could also plausibly be connected with the generation (or destruction) of rule
of law. 
Unfortunately, there exists only a very small economics literature examining the theoretical determinants of rule of law which could
ﬁll vector X in Eq. (2 ). A rich literature exists across disciplines on the possible determinants of democracy , including Muller (1995),
Barro (1999), Berkowitz et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), Csordás and Ludwig (2011) , and Møller and Skaaning (2014) .
These papers focus on the role of economic development, legitimacy, and general regional and global trends in political institutions.
While not explicitly linked with rule of law per se, some of the variables found to associate with democracy could also plausibly
have some overlap with democratic access and predictable decision-making. Unfortunately, many of the most popular correlates with 
democracy, as summarized in Møller and Skaaning (2014) , are not appropriate for examining the source of rule of law in interwar
Poland. Variables such as country size or dominant religion were time-invariant over this period, while data such as urbanization
suﬀer from too few data points (on an annual basis) combined with slow-moving attributes. 17 A commonly-used explanator for rule16 Finally, attempts to model the eﬀects of monetary policy on institutional change in Poland yielded no signiﬁcant results for any variables in the 
system, showing that the VAR had little explanatory eﬀect for capturing relationships within interwar Poland ( Appendix C contains the results of 
this examination). 
17 The working version of this paper used an interpolated series of urbanization which registered as highly signiﬁcant in determining the rule of 
law. However, upon closer examination, the statistical properties of this series (an imposed unit root) and the tight bounding of it over this period 
(Poland’s urbanization rose from an estimated 23.8% of the population to either 28 or 30%, depending on the source) made the results somewhat 
suspect. 
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Table 1 
Data descriptions. 
Variable Description 
Rule of Law Variables 
Regime value Variable capturing the constitutional process, access to democracy, and political competition within a country, taken 
from the MaxRange dataset. The variable is coded from 0–100, with higher numbers signifying more rule of 
law-based political systems. 
Executive constraints The amount of constraints that the executive of a country faces, coded from 1 to 7, with higher number 
corresponding to more constraints. 
Fascism transition Dummy coded as 1 in the month a fascist transition occurred in one of Poland’s neighbouring countries, 0 otherwise. 
Fascism momentum Categorical variable showing the cumulative number of fascist neighbours Poland had by month. 
Average Polity The monthly average of the Polity IV score of Poland’s nine closest neighbours: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, 
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the Soviet Union. 
War A dummy variable taking the value of 1 in the month that Poland was involved in an armed conﬂict and 0 otherwise. 
Currency and controls 
Producer Price Index Survey of wholesale prices across Poland, denominated in z ł oty. Re -indexed by GUS at 2010 = 100 to create a long 
historical series. 
Polish currency to USD 
exchange rate 
The average monthly exchange rate of the oﬃcial Polish currency in circulation (Mark to 1924, z ł oty thereafter). 
Monetary policy stance Two separate variables utilized here: ﬁrst, a month was coded as 1 if the currency in circulation in that month was 
less than the previous month, 0 if otherwise. For the second variable, the monetary policy stance over the quarter 
was examined, with a month coded as 1 if currency in circulation declined for at least three consecutive months, 0 if 
otherwise. 
Regime dummy A dummy taking the value of 0 from December 1918 to April 1924 and 1 afterwards; this captures the break in the 
series after the currency reforms that tamed hyperinﬂation. 
Gold standard A dummy taking the value of 1 for the years that Poland was on the gold standard (October 1927 through April 
1936), 0 otherwise. 
Fiscal capacity The natural log of the nominal amount of money taken in by the national government in direct taxation, expressed 
in USD. Data de-trended to remove strong seasonality from the underlying series. 
Political turnover A dummy variable taking the value of 1 in the month that there was a change of government/Prime Minister, and 0 
otherwise. As noted in the text, any fall in government, even those that retained the same PM, is coded as 1 here. 
Party fractionalization An index of the form 𝐹 = 1 − 
∑𝑚 
𝑖 =1 𝑡 
2 
𝑖 
, where t i is the proportion of members associated with the i th party in the 
lower house of the legislature (in this case, the Sejm ). 
Industrial production Index of industrial production, base year 1928 = 100, augmented as noted below. 
Exports The natural log of the volume of exports for that month, measured in metric tons. Given the seasonality of exports, 
an HP ﬁlter using the same speciﬁcations as all other de-trended data (i.e. 𝜆= 129,600) was used on the raw data. 
Coal production Amount of coal extracted from all Polish territories, in thousands of metric tons. Production after and including 
1922 includes Upper Silesia, which acceded to Poland after a 1921 plebiscite in favor. Series de-trended to account 
for seasonality. 
Emigration Raw number of emigrants from Poland in that month, de-trended to account for seasonal variation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 of law, colonial origin, is also diﬃcult to code here due to the separation of Poland into three Partitions across three competing
Empires in the centuries preceding independence. Perhaps the most promising of the commonly-used correlates, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, suﬀers doubly in the Polish case from relative time-invariance and data issues: not only is the data available only
for two points during the interwar period (due to the General Censuses of 1921 and 1931), there were well-known and politically
motivated attempts to manipulate the language and ethnicity data from the 1931 Census, leading to underrepresentation of ethnic
minorities, especially Jews and Ukrainians ( Corrsin, 1998 ). 
Given these issues, other solutions must be found to explain changes in the rule of law in interwar Poland. For this examination, a
set of covariates will be used, divided into three separate categories, ordered in terms of their possible inﬂuence: political determinants,
macroeconomic determinants, and monetary regime-speciﬁc determinants (a complete description is shown in Table 1 and in the 
Data Appendix). 
4.1.1. Political determinants 
As “rule of law ” is a political concept, it is natural that there would be political determinants and institutional factors inﬂuencing
its level. Krone (2014) oﬀers an extensive list of political and social determinants of the rule of law, including the aforementioned
attributes (ethnolinguistic fractionalization, religion), but we must search at a more micro-oriented level to understand the political 
factors speciﬁcally related to Poland. 
One area of promise found in the political science literature as a key determinant of executive constraints and which is highly
relevant to interwar Poland is the frequency of turnover of the executive. Besley et al. (2016) and Karakas (2016) show that leaders
who have a lower probability of being replaced are less likely to introduce reforms that constrain the executive, while leaders who
are faced with the possibility of being out of power are more likely to attempt to constrain their successors. To measure the eﬀect47 
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 of turnover in the Polish case, I examine Prime Ministerial and governmental changes on a monthly basis, creating a new time-
series coded as 1 in the month that the Prime Minister was changed (even if the government change resulted in the same person
being appointed Prime Minister, as happened in 1922 with Antoni Ponikowski and three times in 1926 with Kazimierz Bartel) and 0
otherwise. 18 Given the high probability of a Prime Minister being replaced in the early years of the Second Republic, it is likely that
turnover did have an eﬀect on the rule of law. Additionally, given the slow-moving nature of the dependent variable, the turnover in
the executive may also capture underlying measures of the political state of Poland. In fact, given that degradation of rule of law in
any country is not instantaneous, turnover should provide a proxy of societal trends which would need to reach a certain threshold
before feeding through to the rule of law measure; however, turnover would continuously aﬀect money growth, due speciﬁcally to
the incentives of politicians. 19 
Similarly, much work has been done in political science on the need for multiple veto points in order to preserve rule of law
( Tsebelis, 1995 ), but the presence of a fragmented party system may also degrade a rules-based regime. As Andrews and Montinola
(2004 :83) note, “highly fragmented party systems in combination with presidential regimes hinder the development of the rule of law,
whereas party fragmentation in parliamentary systems facilitates its development. ” To control for the eﬀects of party fractionalization 
in the interwar period, a fractionalization index, extrapolated from the Cross-National Time Series Database and amended to be 
monthly (rather than annual), will be included as a political control. 
As a ﬁnal attribute of the political system, included here is also ﬁscal capacity of the state, measured by the amount of direct tax
that was taken in by the Polish government. The Second Republic’s ﬁscal capacity could have both inﬂuenced inﬂation and the rule
of law in the interwar period; in the ﬁrst instance, lack of ﬁscal depth would have meant a necessary recourse to the printing press
in order to cover government expenditures, resulting in higher-than-necessary inﬂation. Second, a government attempting to unify 
three distinct regions of Poland, as well as the various regions conquered (East Galicia and the Kresy region) or absorbed by plebiscite
(Upper Silesia), would need some ﬁnancial depth in order to secure a uniform legal system across these territories. Without ﬁscal
capacity, it could be expected that rule of law might suﬀer, especially given the competing visions of rule of law which predominated
in Poland’s eastern (formerly Russian) territories. 20 
4.1.2. Macroeconomic determinants 
Whereas political institutions, as the generator and guarantor of rule of law, may have played an inﬂuential role in Poland’s political
transition during the interwar period, it is also plausible that macroeconomic variables apart from monetary policy inﬂuenced the 
path of political development. But while other suitable candidates for controls emerge from the macroeconomic conditions faced by 
the Second Republic, many of which could play a role in the development of rule of law in a young country, these indicators also have
problems regarding data availability. In the ﬁrst instance, democracy and rule of law tend to be associated with economic growth, and
thus including a suitable proxy for economic activity could isolate these eﬀects ( Skaaning, 2010 ). Unfortunately, indices of industrial
production on a monthly basis are limited for Poland for the interwar period: data from Instytut Badania Konjunktur Gospodarczych i
Cen (the Research Institute for Business Cycles and Prices) could only be traced back to January 1922, while other sources such as
the League of Nations (1945) had annual data and the Statistisches Jahrbuch fu ̈r das Deutsche Reich (Statistical Yearbook for Germany)
had a diﬀerent series of indices starting in 1925. 
To cope with this issue, I use several diﬀerent proxies for economic activity in interwar Poland (see Data Appendix for a description
of sources and methods). The ﬁrst is a measure of unemployment, the number of registered unemployed monthly, obtained from
Drecki (1929) for 1919 through 1928 and thereafter by G ł ówny Urz ąd Statystyczny (GUS, the Polish Central Statistical Oﬃce). Given
that unemployment is a lagging indicator of economic distress, and given that the appearance of unemployment may take time
to translate into political changes, I have seasonally smoothed the series using a Hodrick–Prescott (HP) ﬁlter at a high smoothing
parameter (129,600 for monthly data, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig, 2002 ). Second, a vibrant economy should be expected to
see its exports increasing, and thus I also use the natural log of exports (by volume) as a further indicator of economic activity, but
unfortunately one which begins only in 1920. 
Other country-speciﬁc traits are also used as controls here, derived from the literature and Poland’s unique history, to proxy for
the state of a country’s rule of law. As noted by Norman (2009) and Møller and Skaaning (2014) among others, natural resource
abundance is often negatively correlated with rule of law, with rents creating a source of corruption and stiﬂing political competition
( Bulte and Damania, 2008 ). Along these lines, coal was a valuable resource which Poland had a comparative advantage in during the
interwar period, and thus production of coal is used here as a proxy for resource dependence. Given the seasonality of coal production,
it too has been de-trended using the HP ﬁlter. 
Another area in which Poland excelled was in the export of its people, with massive levels of emigration from the country beginning
in the late 19th century and continuing through the interwar period. It is plausible that emigration is also a key determinant of rule of
law, although the direction of its inﬂuence is debatable. As Landgrave and Nowrasteh (2016) summarize, emigration could worsen the
rule of law in a country if the best and brightest emigrate, leaving behind a strengthened current regime with an aversion to reform.
On the other hand, as shown in Hirschman (1978) in relation to Ireland, emigration can also spur institutional reform at home, as
elites are concerned that a critical mass of emigration could actually threaten the viability of the country. Moreover, “emigration can
improve institutions… by increasing the political bargaining power of those who remain. Emigration can create a safety valve that 18 This coding was based on the information contained in the MaxRange dataset and was cross-checked with the Cross-National Time Series dataset, 
which contains annual data on the number of major cabinet changes in Poland occurring over 1918-1939. 
19 Thanks to John Leahy for suggesting the need to address underlying, faster-moving trends. 
20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out how ﬁscal capacity could inﬂuence both attributes of interest here. 
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 decreases the cost of dissent because the dissenter can conceivably leave ” ( Landgrave and Nowrasteh, 2016 :2). In our example here,
these channels may have prevented overreach by the government of newly-independent Poland, who needed to keep skilled workers
in the country, while also allowing for better bargaining power of the intelligentsia in crafting Poland’s new institutions. In other
words, although we know that Poland did become an authoritarian state by 1939, it is possible that it would have succumbed to full
fascism or communism earlier if there had not been the outlet of emigration. 
4.1.3. Monetary regime-speciﬁc determinants 
Finally, monetary policy is our key independent variable of interest, but monetary policy could inﬂuence the rule of law only
through monetary institutions, and interwar Poland had several policy and institutional regime shifts during the Second Republic. 
Moving from ﬁat money with some gold/foreign currency backing in 1919 to 1926 to a full gold standard in late 1927, and then
abandoning the gold standard in 1936 and returning to ﬁat money, Poland’s monetary institutions were evolving and changing
constantly. Such changes must also be accounted for, as it could have been a particular monetary regime which inﬂuenced rule of
law rather than overall monetary policy. Of these regimes, it is likely that the shift to gold would have had the largest impact as it
directly aﬀected the creation of currency (and thus impacted the rule of law). To account for this change in regime, I have included
a dummy variable equal to 1 for each month that Poland was on the full gold standard and 0 otherwise. Such a shift in monetary
regimes could also capture underlying political currents that are not captured by the many political variables just described —that is,
the geopolitical reasoning behind adopting and retaining the gold standard. 
In addition, the reality of the interwar period is that Poland also underwent a structural break in its monetary policy following
the currency reforms of 1924, from a hyperinﬂationary rush to a more “normal ” policy framework. A time dummy is included in the
regressions to account for this break, coded as 0 for every month prior to the currency reform (April 1924) and 1 for every month
thereafter; this formulation will allow for capturing changes in monetary policy formulation in addition to the actual policies proxied
by the PPI/exchange rate/policy stance variables. 
4.2. Choice of estimator 
The identiﬁcation approach using a theory of the rule of law needs some additional clariﬁcation in terms of estimation. As the
regime value indicator is slow-moving, even with our higher-frequency dataset, ordinary least squares (OLS) or time-series techniques 
may not be suﬃcient to understand the deeper relationships between the rule of law and monetary policy. Moreover, the speed of
motion of the regime value (shown in Fig. 1 ) may send inappropriate signals regarding the presence of a unit root ( Francis and Ramey,
2009 ); in particular, a battery of stationarity tests performed on the regime value indicator showed weak stationarity (generally
clustered in the 5–15% signiﬁcance range, depending upon the test utilized). 21 Given these stylized facts, the preferred estimator 
for the empirical examination is a Poisson regression, an approach common in the operations literature for inventory and other
slow-moving goods ( Williams, 1984 ) but also utilized in settings such as trade negotiations ( Pahre, 2001 ) and energy market reforms
( Erdogdu, 2013 ). 22 A Poisson regression is also applicable in this case, as we are essentially estimating a “demand for rule of law, ”
with (as Granger and Jeon (2003:6) said in the context of ﬁnancial crises) “exceptional events occurring with a Poisson process
having a stochastically varying intensity, so that the probability of an event happening is changing. ” The Poisson approach, however,
imposes the strict condition that a series have equidispersion —that is, an equal conditional mean and conditional variance, a condition
which is not fulﬁlled for the majority of our data (see Fig. 8 for a visualization of the data and Table 2 for summary statistics). 23 
To correct for the overdispersion of our monetary policy variables, we instead utilize a negative binomial (NB) approach, designed
to handle overdispersion in the data. The NB estimation is done via a quasi-generalized pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator as
shown in Gourieroux et al. (1984) , with the variance parameter obtained from the results of the Wooldridge (1997) overdispersion
test. To account for heteroskedasticity and misspeciﬁcation of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, we also utilize
Generalized Linear Model (GLM) robust standard errors. 
An issue that may arise is that even these generalized linear models assume the strict exogeneity of monetary policy, a condition
that is diﬃcult to satisfy even in a zero-history environment like the beginning of the Second Polish Republic. As a further robust-
ness check, I also use an instrumental variables (IV) Poisson generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator as formulated by
Mullahy (1997) and Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997) . This model takes the general form of: 
𝑦 𝑖 = exp 
(
𝑥 ′𝑖 𝛽1 + 𝑦 ′2 , 𝑖 𝛽2 
)
+ 𝜖𝑖 (4) 
Where the dependent variable y is a function of a matrix of exogenous regressors ( x ’), endogenous regressors (shown in Eq. (4 ) as
y 2 ), and an error term 𝜖 (this version of the model uses additive errors, there also is a variant where the errors are multiplicative).21 The results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS), and Ng-Perron unit root tests showed stationarity 
at the 10% level, while the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock and Dickey-Fuller-GLS (DF-GLS) tests showed stationarity at the 5% level. Alternately, the 
Phillips-Perron test showed non-stationarity (15% level) while an ADF test including additive outliers to account for a structural break gave results 
of strong non-stationary ( p- value of 0.43 versus the null of a unit root). 
22 Poisson estimation is a form of generalized linear modeling which requires a non-negative dependent variable and solves the likelihood function 
for n independent Poisson observations as a product of probabilities given by Pr { 𝑌 = 𝑦 } = 𝜇𝑦 𝑒 − 𝜇∕ 𝑦 ! . 
23 The results of Wooldridge (1997) residual-based testing for each monetary policy variable rejected decisively the null of equidispersion, instead 
showing slight (but signiﬁcant) overdispersion in the data. Results available from the author on request. 
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Fig. 8. Visualization of all variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GMM estimation then uses instruments for the endogenous regressors (denoted as z i ) to specify moment conditions that hold in the
population, solving a minimization problem to make the sample-moment conditions as close to zero as is possible. 
The use of instrumental variable techniques in time-series data, while uncommon compared to VAR estimation, is not unheard of,
especially in relation to monetary policy. In fact, many of the examinations of Taylor Rules in single countries rely on some form of
IV or GMM estimation, including inter alia Hayo and Hofmann (2006), Consolo and Favero (2009), Va š íček (2010) , or Koustas and
Lamarche (2012) . However, it is in studies examining institutional change and institutional break-down (areas where an explicit 
theoretical approach is called for) that IV estimation (and especially IV-Poisson approaches) of time-series data has begun to ﬂourish.
Dube and Vargas (2013) are perhaps the most relevant example of this approach, as they examine conﬂict incidence in Colombia
using an explicit IV-Poisson estimator to account for commodity production; along similar lines, Henderson and Kuncoro (2004) model 
corruption in Indonesia using instruments for ﬁscal capacity in an IV-Poisson framework. Other examples of the use of IV-Poisson
estimation in relation to institutions in a single country come from Vézina (2012) , who models trade in Switzerland as a function of
informal institutional change using a variety of IV techniques, including an IV-Poisson estimator, and Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009) ,
who examine innovation in German manufacturing via IV-Tobit and IV-Poisson methods. 
To select a suitable instrument set, the instrumentation strategy used here is based on “general to speciﬁc ” (GETS) modelling. The
GETS approach is straightforward, sequentially dropping insigniﬁcant regressors via t- statistics and joint F-tests in order to reach a
parsimonious model ( Hendry, 2000 ). Once this model has been obtained, however, the insigniﬁcant variables can be employed as
instruments for the remaining endogenous variables (in this case, monetary policy), as they satisfy the restriction exclusion: that is,
these variables are already excluded from the model of interest via lack of inﬂuence on the dependent variable, with their only eﬀect
occurring in the ﬁrst-stage of the regression ( Angrist and Pischke, 2008 ). This approach was developed by Lawson and Wang (2005) in
the context of Central and Eastern European transition economies, and further implemented by Berkowitz and DeJong (2005), Gerlach 
and Peng (2005 , in the context of monetary policy), Saxegaard (2006) , and Kalyuzhnova et al. (2009) . More importantly from a
theoretical standpoint, this strategy encompasses the reality that some macroeconomic or political variables may act on the rule of
law through indirect, rather than direct, channels. Further tests on the suitability of the instrument set will be veriﬁed via results from
Hansen’s test of overidentifying restrictions and, most importantly, by recourse to the literature and underlying economic theory. As 
with the NB estimation, robust standard errors are used. 
5. Results of the empirical examination 
Beginning with the negative binomial model, the results can be seen in Tables 3 –6 . For the monetary policy variables, a step-wise
addition of control variables is utilized, starting with a simple bivariate regression and then increasing the number of controls until50 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics. 
Variable Summary statistics 
Mean Median Max Min Std. Deviation n 
Rule of Law Variables 
Regime value 46.41 34.00 100.00 6.00 31.80 249 
Executive constraints 5.30 5.00 7.00 3.00 1.473 249 
Fascism transition 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.126 249 
Fascism momentum 0.72 0.00 4.00 0.00 1.107 249 
Average Polity 0.658 1.89 4.63 − 5.67 3.53 249 
War 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.297 249 
Currency and controls 
Producer Price Index 3194.60 3329.20 5974.32 0.01 1845.74 237 
Polish currency to USD exchange rate 6,630,000,000.00 188,630.70 198,000,000,000.00 91,800.56 27,300,000,000.00 206 
Monetary Policy Stance 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.47 249 
Regime dummy 0.739 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 249 
Gold standard 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.493 249 
Fiscal capacity 8.35 8.60 9.50 6.40 0.87 248 
Political turnover 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.32 249 
Political fractionalization 8.94 8.97 9.10 8.78 0.12 249 
Industrial production 81.85 76.15 129.80 46.50 21.61 174 
Exports and Imports 6.82 7.14 7.98 − 0.66 1.13 237 
Coal production 7.67 7.92 8.39 5.33 0.67 245 
Emigration 8.59 8.56 9.34 7.05 0.52 246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the full model is reached as described in the previous section. This approach follows the identiﬁcation strategy of Section 4 in that it
makes recourse to a theory of determinants of rule of law. In this approach, starting from the variable of interest (monetary policy),
we add controls based on their likelihood of inﬂuence on rule of law: ﬁrst, political institutions and their functioning are included
(assuming rule of law as a political creature), and then the macroeconomic controls are added to see if the theorized relationship
continues to hold. 
Several observations stand out immediately from the analysis. In the ﬁrst instance, the preferred metric for monetary policy, the
PPI, has a consistent eﬀect across stepwise regressions ( Table 3 ), negatively related to Poland’s rule of law. In regard to producer
prices, a higher PPI corresponds with a very small economic eﬀect on the rule of law, as a 100% increase in Poland’s PPI would
correlate with only a drop of two points in the regime value indicator. 24 The reasons behind this relatively small eﬀect may be due
to the fact that producer prices do not adjust immediately to changes in monetary policy (a large body of evidence suggests that
producer prices change infrequently and in small amounts), and thus much of the eﬀect on rule of law by monetary policy may
already be priced in by the time producers adjust. 
Some evidence is given for this theory when looking at the eﬀect of the exchange rate on rule of law ( Table 4 ). In the ﬁrst instance,
the exchange rate indicator has the unenviable task of proxying for nearly all macroeconomic variables in the early regressions, but as
additional controls are added (and in particular unemployment), the “true ” eﬀects of the exchange rate become apparent. However,
when we control for unemployment and other macroeconomic variables, each 100% increase in the z ł oty/USD exchange rate appears
to correlate with a drop of approximately 15% in the regime value indicator. Put another way, a rise in the oﬃcial gold standard
exchange rate of 8.90 to 17.80 z ł oty per dollar would result in the diﬀerence between Poland being coded as having a “Qualiﬁed
democratic indirect Presidentialism ” and one that has a “Semi-Democratic Presidentialism ” (on the MaxRange scale, as shown in 
Appendix A ). 
Comparable results are found when examining the dichotomous monetary policy stance variable in Tables 5 and 6: as the coding
of the dummy is reversed (i.e. 1 for tightening), positive numbers signify the counterfactual, namely an increase in the rule of law
due to monetary tightening. As with the exchange rate, such a broad variable is absorbing many macroeconomic eﬀects when left
on its own, but once labour movements are accounted for, monetary policy eﬀects become clear and incredibly signiﬁcant: indeed,
on average, monetary tightening in the interwar Polish Republic was associated with a rise in the regime variable of 10%, while
continuous tightening over an entire quarter resulted in a 22% increase in the regime variable ( Table 6 ). 
These results hold with the addition of a full set of covariates, most of which are also signiﬁcant and with a similar (if slightly
larger) economic eﬀect, as predicted by theory. For example, every percentage point rise in coal production in Poland is associated
with between a 1% to 2% drop in the regime value, while a percentage increase in party fractionalization consistently yields about a
0.10% increase in the regime value. Openness, as proxied by exports, appears to be unequivocally good for keeping a regime open as
well, as does having many parties in parliament. Of immense interest is also the eﬀect of the gold standard on the rule of law, which,24 However, the eﬀect is highly persistent at much deeper lags. See Appendix B , which includes the coeﬃcients and t-stats from the full model 
using lags over three years. 
51 
C
.A
.
 H
a
rtw
ell
 
E
x
p
lo
ra
tio
n
s
 in
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
 H
isto
ry
 6
8
 (2
0
1
8
)
 3
7
–
7
0
 
Table 3 
Baseline negative binomial regressions: producer price index. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Producer Price Index − 0.0001 − 0.0001 − 0.0001 − 0.00004 − 0.0002 − 0.0002 − 0.0001 − 0.0001 − 0.0001 − 0.0002 
6.53 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.74 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.70 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.35 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.43 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.15 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.23 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.52 ∗ ∗ 2.53 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.48 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Gold Standard 
Dummy 
− 0.48 − 0.48 − 0.75 − 0.76 − 0.52 − 0.60 − 0.49 − 0.47 − 0.32 
5.54 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.54 ∗ ∗ ∗ 15.43 ∗ ∗ ∗ 16.55 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.40 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.37 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.37 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.46 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.43 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Political Turnover 0.04 − 0.08 − 0.09 − 0.11 − 0.10 − 0.11 − 0.11 − 0.07 
0.37 1.32 1.50 1.98 ∗ ∗ 1.81 ∗ 1.99 ∗ ∗ 2.00 ∗ ∗ 1.39 
Party 
Fractionalization 
0.20 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.12 
29.92 ∗ ∗ ∗ 30.14 ∗ ∗ ∗ 20.50 ∗ ∗ ∗ 17.28 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.49 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.06 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.63 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Coal Production 0.51 0.27 0.47 − 1.59 − 1.60 − 1.39 
6.78 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.22 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.91 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.58 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.59 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.98 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Emigration 0.46 0.04 0.32 0.35 0.46 
5.66 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.19 1.55 1.55 2.26 ∗ ∗ 
Unemployment trend − 0.41 − 0.21 − 0.17 − 0.36 
2.32 ∗ ∗ 1.18 0.79 1.63 
Log Exports 0.84 0.84 0.70 
3.41 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.42 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.66 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Fiscal capacity − 0.02 − 0.19 
0.32 2.69 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Regime 
Dummy 
0.69 
4.56 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
C 4.23 4.22 4.21 2.63 − 1.11 − 2.94 4.07 9.45 8.96 10.88 
52.45 ∗ ∗ ∗ 63.30 ∗ ∗ ∗ 61.28 ∗ ∗ ∗ 41.02 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.01 ∗ ∗ 4.69 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.32 2.80 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.42 ∗ ∗ 2.97 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
n 237 237 237 237 234 233 233 233 233 233 
sample 1919M1- 
1939M8 
1919M1- 
1939M8 
1919M1- 
1939M8 
1919M1- 
1939M8 
1920M1- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
adjusted R-squared 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.72 0.75 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 
QML parameter 0.333872 0.300091 0.297387 0.085315 0.0670725 0.052147 0.050715 0.048381 0.04837 3.586328 
Absolute value of t -statistics under coeﬃcients. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4 
Baseline negative binomial regressions: PLN/USD exchange rate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
PLN/USD Exchange Rate 0.07 0.04 0.04 − 0.004 0.03 − 0.03 − 0.13 − 0.12 − 0.16 − 0.15 
6.08 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.07 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.02 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.77 1.26 1.17 4.75 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.40 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.25 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.29 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Gold Standard Dummy − 0.50 − 0.50 − 0.85 − 0.83 − 0.64 − 0.71 − 0.57 − 0.67 − 0.67 
6.07 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.07 ∗ ∗ ∗ 18.43 ∗ ∗ ∗ 17.11 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.20 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.81 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.38 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.64 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.57 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Political Turnover 0.02 − 0.06 − 0.08 − 0.06 − 0.06 − 0.08 − 0.07 − 0.07 
0.16 1.01 1.20 0.92 1.20 1.46 1.30 1.24 
Party Fractionalization 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.12 
29.92 ∗ ∗ ∗ 28.82 ∗ ∗ ∗ 19.88 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.40 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.30 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.58 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Coal Production 0.21 − 0.51 − 0.24 − 2.20 − 2.15 − 2.11 
1.43 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.26 ∗ ∗ 1.15 3.59 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.47 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.37 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Emigration 0.36 − 0.43 − 0.03 − 0.24 − 0.27 
3.81 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.97 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.22 1.41 1.50 
Unemployment trend − 1.16 − 0.82 − 1.24 − 1.27 
10.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.65 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.97 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.95 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Log Exports 0.82 0.69 0.70 
3.40 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.77 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.80 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Fiscal capacity 0.19 0.17 
2.83 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.08 ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Regime Dummy 0.09 
0.57 
C 2.85 3.41 3.41 2.56 0.49 3.89 24.45 26.37 32.76 32.92 
17.62 ∗ ∗ ∗ 21.11 ∗ ∗ ∗ 21.10 ∗ ∗ ∗ 30.18 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.34 2.41 ∗ ∗ 8.91 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.88 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.38 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.40 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
n 248 248 248 248 234 233 233 233 233 233 
sample 1919M1- 
1939M8 
1919M1- 
1939M8 
1919M1- 
1939M8 
1919M1- 
1939M8 
1920M2- 
1939M7 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.25 0.24 0.71 0.70 0.67 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.82 
QML parameter 0.340779 0.292492 0.292354 0.083156 0.0904 8.05722 0.048919 0.04428 0.041824 0.041601 
Absolute value of t -statistics under coeﬃcients. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5 
Baseline negative binomial regressions: monthly monetary policy stance. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Monetary policy Stance − 0.31 − 0.10 − 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 
3.37 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.31 1.26 1.67 ∗ 1.50 1.97 ∗ ∗ 2.94 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.95 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.95 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.34 ∗ ∗ 
Gold Standard Dummy − 0.65 − 0.64 − 0.86 − 0.87 − 0.76 − 0.63 − 0.59 − 0.59 − 0.59 
9.14 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.06 ∗ ∗ ∗ 20.99 ∗ ∗ ∗ 18.41 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.79 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.69 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.61 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.66 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.69 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Political Turnover 0.07 − 0.06 − 0.07 − 0.08 − 0.07 − 0.10 − 0.10 − 0.08 
0.66 1.09 1.12 1.33 1.23 1.86 ∗ 1.86 ∗ 1.42 
Party Fractionalization 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 
31.37 ∗ ∗ ∗ 29.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ 20.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ 17.09 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.25 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.55 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Coal Production 0.02 − 0.18 0.49 − 1.74 − 1.74 − 1.68 
0.45 2.15 ∗ ∗ 4.07 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.81 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.81 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.71 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Emigration 0.24 − 0.41 − 0.03 − 0.02 − 0.17 
2.96 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.49 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.19 0.13 0.94 
Unemployment trend − 0.95 − 0.57 − 0.56 − 0.83 
8.45 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.36 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.43 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.31 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Log Exports 0.94 0.94 0.91 
3.84 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.84 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.73 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Fiscal capacity − 0.008 − 0.06 
0.12 0.99 
Monetary Regime Dummy 0.36 
2.60 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
C 3.93 4.08 4.06 2.49 2.32 1.87 14.19 17.19 17.07 21.63 
75.48 ∗ ∗ ∗ 91.89 ∗ ∗ ∗ 87.24 ∗ ∗ ∗ 45.30 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.95 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.52 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.51 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.84 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.26 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.62 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
n 249 249 248 248 234 233 233 233 233 233 
sample 1918M12- 
1939M8 
1918M12- 
1939M8 
1919M1- 
1939M8 
1919M1- 
1939M8 
1920M2- 
1939M7 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.19 0.19 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.82 
QML parameter 0.41952 0.32158 0.32296 0.081747 0.088555 0.08922 3.986015 0.045315 0.045313 0.043991 
Absolute value of t -statistics under coeﬃcients. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 6 
Baseline negative binomial regressions: quarterly monetary policy stance. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Monetary Policy Stance 
Quarterly 
− 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.22 
0.25 0.97 1.00 2.20 ∗ ∗ 2.17 ∗ ∗ 2.48 ∗ ∗ 3.42 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.36 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.36 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.94 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Gold Standard Dummy − 0.69 − 0.68 − 0.79 − 0.77 − 0.75 − 0.75 − 0.58 − 0.58 − 0.63 
10.26 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.15 ∗ ∗ ∗ 20.04 ∗ ∗ ∗ 16.94 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.68 ∗ ∗ ∗ 13.36 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.48 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.55 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.54 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Political Turnover 0.08 − 0.03 − 0.04 − 0.07 − 0.08 − 0.09 − 0.09 − 0.10 
0.75 0.47 0.58 1.21 1.43 1.69 ∗ 1.69 ∗ 1.88 ∗ 
Party Fractionalization 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.13 
35.65 ∗ ∗ ∗ 32.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ 20.00 ∗ ∗ ∗ 16.39 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.16 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.47 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.42 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Coal Production − 0.04 − 0.17 0.61 − 1.70 − 1.70 − 1.74 
0.67 2.12 ∗ ∗ 5.50 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.76 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.76 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.14 ∗ ∗ 
Emigration 0.24 − 0.49 − 0.04 − 0.04 − 0.19 
2.95 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.54 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.27 0.21 0.91 
Unemployment trend − 0.92 − 0.58 − 0.57 − 0.79 
9.18 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.41 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.49 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.92 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Log Exports 0.93 0.93 0.97 
3.82 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.81 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.02 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Fiscal capacity − 0.005 − 0.05 
0.09 0.87 
Monetary Regime Dummy 0.31 
2.71 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
C 3.84 4.05 4.04 2.54 2.82 1.87 13.53 17.14 17.05 21.26 
83.49 ∗ ∗ ∗ 95.42 ∗ ∗ ∗ 90.31 ∗ ∗ ∗ 56.66 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.79 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.55 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.87 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.30 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.13 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
n 249 249 248 248 234 233 233 233 233 233 
sample 1918M12- 
1939M8 
1918M12- 
1939M8 
1919M1- 
1939M8 
1919M1- 
1939M8 
1920M2- 
1939M7 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.19 0.19 0.71 0.69 0.70 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.83 
QML parameter 0.445816 0.32148 0.322432 7.009119 7.667092 0.087935 0.0473933 0.044815 0.044815 0.001309 
Absolute value of t -statistics under coeﬃcients. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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 as theorized above, appeared to be a tool for the Sanacja regime to maintain its power. The empirical results also show the time that
Poland was on the gold standard to be signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with rule of law, perhaps conﬁrming this thesis. Indeed,
whereas a gold standard should, ceteris paribus, be anticipated to contribute to the rule of law, if it is implemented under a situation
of pre-existing authoritarianism, it could have the opposite eﬀect. 25 
5.1. Robustness tests 
These results show a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between monetary proﬂigacy and the decline of the rule of in interwar
Poland. However, there may be other issues present, independent of monetary policy, which could have contributed to the erosion
of rule of law in the Second Republic, including the wave of fascism which took hold in the 1930s across Europe. In an inversion
of Csordás and Ludwig (2011) , who showed that democratic transitions in a country are strongly inﬂuenced by transitions in their
neighbours, perhaps Poland’s move to fascism and away from rule of law was inﬂuenced by the general environment of Central and
Eastern Europe at the time. That is, perhaps fascist transitions in the neighbourhood of Poland, in particular in Germany and Austria
(former colonial masters of Poland but still with strong ties to the Polish economy), had a disproportionate eﬀect on Poland’s own
political transition. 
To capture this eﬀect econometrically, I use two separate dummy variables on the full models from the previous section: the ﬁrst
is a categorical variable equal to the cumulative number of neighbours of Poland that were fascist in any given month, while the
second dummy focuses on fascist transitions, coded 1 for a month in which a neighbouring country experienced a fascist transition
and 0 otherwise. As an additional check, much like Csordás and Ludwig (2011) , I also use the average Polity IV democracy score of
Poland’s closest neighbours to examine authoritarian tendencies in the region; 26 this is done precisely because interwar Europe as 
a whole became increasingly more authoritarian during the 1930s, especially in Poland’s neighbourhood, but only a few countries 
became explicitly fascist along the German or Italian model. 27 
The results of these robustness checks on the full models are shown in Table 7 , and the inclusion of neither the cumulative fascist
neighbours, fascist transitions, nor authoritarian tendencies has an eﬀect on the overall relationship between monetary policy and 
the rule of law in Poland (macroeconomic and institutional controls are omitted to save space). In fact, the eﬀects of a tightened
monetary policy and of an increase in producer prices are strengthened, while the eﬀect of a short-term monetary policy shift is less
signiﬁcant statistically. The developments in Poland’s neighbourhood do seem to have had some inﬂuence on Poland’s own political
development, with the number of fascist neighbours weighing on Poland’s rule of law and, conversely, higher average Polity IV scores
associated with a higher regime value in Poland. 
While the political developments of Poland’s neighbours had some bearing on the development of its rule of law, perhaps the
development of the global economy was more important; that is, in a total inversion of the hierarchy of institutions, perhaps it was
the trend in the world economy during the interwar period which led to the erosion of the rule of law rather than monetary conditions
in Poland. To test this possibility, I include three additional sets of regressions, one using data from the United States (US) to proxy
for global economic trends, one using data from Poland’s large neighbour Germany, and one accounting for regional conﬂict. 
In the case of the US, industrial production data going back to the 1920s was readily available as an indicator of global economic
trends. Additionally, given the importance of US capital markets to growth in the interwar period, monthly returns on the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) are used to capture market sentiment. Finally, as a trend indicator for global monetary policy, US year-on-
year inﬂation indices are also included to see if Poland’s monetary policy was merely playing follow-the-leader. 28 Table 8 shows the
results of this extension of the basic model and, as with the inclusion of neighbourhood political variables, the US economic variables
are signiﬁcant (although the Dow Jones results are marginal and depend upon the speciﬁcation used). In a perhaps odd result, the
inclusion of the US variables shows that inﬂation abroad correlated with a strengthened rule of law at home and exactly the opposite
for global economic trends; this may be due to Poland’s own internal issues in overcoming challenges from independence, and may
be a correlation rather than causation. 29 The inclusion of US economic indicators do not, however, vitiate the results of Poland’s
monetary indicators, which retain the same signs, signiﬁcance, and economic eﬀect. 
A similar outcome is apparent when we include Germany’s variables instead of those of the US ( Table 9 ), on the assumption that
Polish economic trends would more likely be inﬂuenced by closer countries which were more integrated with Poland. Germany did
not have the same data series available as the US, and so I have instead used the log of German iron output to proxy for overall
economic health, and, as in the case of Poland, Germany’s PPI to proxy for inﬂation. Including German economic indicators reveal
the same trends as seen with the US, with German industrial strength corresponding to slightly lower rule of law in Poland, and25 This assertion is not explicitly tested here, but makes an interesting avenue for future research. 
26 The countries used for this comparison include Austria, Czechoslovakia (through March 1939), Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, and the Soviet Union, chosen due to their geographic proximity. 
27 Hungary is a prime example of this eﬀect, as the Kingdom remained conservative and became increasingly more militant and aligned with Nazi 
Germany as the 1930s progressed. However, as Blinkhorn (2014) notes, Hungary’s authoritarianism, while substantial, never quite reached the 
fascist pitch of Germany until 1938, when it acquired a racial (anti-Jewish) and nationalist/militaristic fusion. 
28 Additional tests, not shown, experimented with deeper lags of these global variables. As expected, the eﬀect of global economic conditions 
decayed fairly rapidly, with statistically signiﬁcant results back one year but with diminishing economic importance. The inclusion of these variables 
at deeper lags only strengthened the impact of monetary policy on rule of law, both statistically and economically. 
29 See the Data Appendix for a description of the US and German variables and data sources. 
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Table 7 
Robustness tests accounting for neighbourhood developments. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Producer Price Index − 0.0002 − 0.0002 − 0.0002 
4.13 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.02 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.88 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
PLN/USD Exchange Rate − 0.15 − 0.13 − 0.15 
4.29 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.93 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.63 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Policy Stance 
(monthly) 
0.10 0.07 0.09 
2.33 ∗ ∗ 1.74 ∗ 2.11 ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Policy Stance 
(quarterly) 
0.19 0.14 0.17 
3.57 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.68 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.16 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Fascist Transitions − 0.03 − 0.02 − 0.01 0.01 
0.15 0.12 0.05 0.06 
Fascist neighbours − 0.20 − 0.15 − 0.16 − 0.14 
5.20 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.93 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.06 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.64 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Average Polity IV 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 
3.89 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.39 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.82 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.45 ∗ ∗ 
C 10.98 32.92 21.63 21.73 9.07 31.65 21.74 21.81 7.73 32.23 20.64 20.87 
2.99 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.40 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.62 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.81 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.59 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.36 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.00 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.13 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.12 ∗ ∗ 9.48 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.35 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.54 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
n 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
sample 1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
1920M2- 
1939M6 
adjusted R-squared 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.82 
QML parameter 0.042493 0.04158 0.043984 0.042344 0.037064 0.037298 0.039802 0.0391 0.041773 0.041686 0.044114 0.042515 
Absolute value of t -statistics under coeﬃcients. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Macroeconomic and institutional controls included but not shown for 
reasons of space 
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Table 8 
Robustness tests including US production/inﬂation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Producer Price Index − 0.0001 − 0.0002 
3.02 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.10 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
PLN/USD Exchange Rate − 0.14 − 0.15 
4.51 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.42 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Policy Stance (monthly) 0.10 0.10 
2.47 ∗ ∗ 2.32 ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Policy Stance (quarterly) 0.18 0.19 
3.40 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.46 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
US Industrial Production ( − 1) − 0.16 − 0.17 − 0.18 − 0.17 
4.06 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.48 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.56 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.25 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
US Inﬂation ( − 1) 2.32 2.69 2.70 2.61 
4.61 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.62 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.54 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.37 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Dow Jones Returns − 0.79 − 0.96 − 0.82 − 0.71 
1.64 1.98 ∗ ∗ 1.68 ∗ 1.46 
C 15.63 35.09 23.87 24.21 11.58 33.78 22.15 22.19 
3.91 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.99 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.83 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.08 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.15 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.63 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.80 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.95 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
n 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
QML parameter 0.035474 0.033446 0.035156 0.034947 0.042207 0.040741 0.043624 0.04212 
Absolute value of t -statistics under coeﬃcients. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Macroeconomic 
and institutional controls included but not shown for reasons of space 
Table 9 
Robustness tests including german economic conditions. 
1 2 3 4 
Producer Price Index − 0.0004 
8.77 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
PLN/USD Exchange Rate − 0.13 
2.90 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Policy Stance (monthly) 0.09 
2.06 ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Policy Stance (quarterly) 0.18 
3.29 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
German Iron Production ( − 1) − 1.19 − 0.08 − 0.36 − 0.34 
8.39 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.51 2.90 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.81 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
German PPI ( − 1) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
3.70 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.54 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.15 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
War 
C − 6.60 34.46 24.33 24.39 
1.53 8.15 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.99 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.16 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
n 233 233 233 233 
sample 1920M2-1939M6 1920M2-1939M6 1920M2-1939M6 1920M2-1939M6 
adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.83 
QML parameter 0.033649 0.036945 0.039615 0.037967 
Absolute value of t -statistics under coeﬃcients. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Macroeconomic and institutional controls included but not shown for reasons of space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 German inﬂation corresponding with higher levels. In either case, the eﬀect of Polish monetary policy on rule of law does not waver,
and, as with the US, the direction and magnitude of the eﬀect is mostly unchanged. 
Finally, perhaps the encroachment of neighbours or Poland’s own foreign adventurism had an eﬀect on rule of law in Poland? It
has long been argued that a negative correlation exists between war and the rule of law, with governments suspending legal niceties
in pursuit of victory ( Collier, 1999 ). Moreover, as the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth showed, there also was a strong
relationship between military conﬂict and monetary proﬂigacy, with war leading to both currency debasement and the erosion of
rule of law. This is another plausible explanator for Poland’s decline in rule of law during the interwar period, as the Second Republic
was involved in a number of armed clashes or outright wars occurring in its early years: conﬂict with Ukrainians in Galicia from
November 1918 through July 1919 resulted in the absorption of eastern Galicia into Poland, while a Bolshevik invasion extended58 
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Table 10 
Robustness tests including the eﬀects of war. 
1 2 3 4 
Producer Price Index − 0.0002 
4.07 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
PLN/USD Exchange Rate − 0.15 
4.64 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Policy Stance (monthly) 0.09 
2.30 ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Policy Stance (quarterly) 0.19 
3.62 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
War 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.56 
4.08 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.46 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.14 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.19 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
C 15.74 37.79 26.00 26.06 
4.23 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.75 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.86 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.06 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
n 233 233 233 233 
sample 1920M2-1939M6 1920M2-1939M6 1920M2-1939M6 1920M2-1939M6 
adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.83 
QML parameter 0.039223 0.036521 0.040093 0.038542 
Absolute value of t -statistics under coeﬃcients. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Macroeconomic and institutional controls included but not shown for reasons of space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 this conﬂict through until early 1921 and nearly resulted in the dismemberment of the Republic (before the “Miracle on the Vistula ”
turned back the Russian invasion). On Poland’s western front, there also were armed insurrections in Upper Silesia that were silenced
only with the plebiscite that put the region into Polish hands, while to the north there was a brief war with Lithuania that was part
of the broader struggle in Ukraine and Russia. 
To test if war, rather than monetary policy, was the driving factor in Poland’s deteriorating rule of law, I include a dummy variable
to capture if Poland was engaged in conﬂict in that particular month, based on data in Brecke (1999) . Results of these augmented
regressions using the war dummy, shown in Table 10 , show that Poland’s wars, localized in the early years of its independence,
actually had a salutary correlation with rule of law. This could be a statistical, rather than historical, relationship, due to the lack of
conﬂict after 1921, or it could show an endogenous relationship between a democracy, seeking to unite the country territorially, and
an autocracy, seeking to consolidate its gains. Regardless, the monetary policy variables all continue to have a similar eﬀect on rule
of law, even in the presence of conﬂict. 
Finally, as noted above and just mentioned, these results from the negative binomial regressions could be plagued by endogeneity,
in that monetary policy itself could be subject to the structure of political institutions and other macroeconomic outcomes. The
strategy, noted above, utilizes all of the variables of the previous examination (including in the robustness regressions) from the
outset to ﬁnd a parsimonious model. 30 Once obtained, monetary policy in instrumented with the insigniﬁcant macroeconomic and 
institutional variables removed during the GETS procedure, in the manner of Lawson and Wang (2005) , but with recourse to the
literature on the determinants of monetary policy outcomes. 
This approach yields surprisingly similar results to the NB estimations ( Table 11 ), especially in regard to the PPI. Column 1
builds on an extensive literature on the non-political determinants of a country’s PPI, including Feinberg (1986) and, more recently,
Álvarez et al. (2010) , which show how international competition, economic integration, and labor conditions aﬀect producer price
changes. Following this lead, we instrument Poland’s PPI with the country’s exposure to external factors (German PPI, export volumes,
Dow Jones returns) and internal political ones (political turnover, unemployment, the monetary policy regime). As shown in Column
1, we obtain both the same tiny eﬀect as seen in the NB regressions and a satisfactory pass on all econometric tests. 31 These eﬀects
hold across all of the IV Poisson regressions, including the exchange rate (Column 2), which shows a slightly stronger drag on rule of
law when instrumented properly, and the monthly monetary policy stance (Column 3), which shows a much stronger eﬀect on rule
of law than in the NB regressions. Finally, Column 4 shows an incredibly strong relationship between the quarterly monetary policy
stance and the rule of law, with each month preceded by a quarter of monetary tightening associated with an increase in the regime
value of 2.24. For the most part, the covariates also act as expected, although the sign changes on emigration across variables and the
eﬀect of fascist transitions is diﬀerent depending upon the monetary policy indicator utilized. Thus, the results for these particular30 Average Polity scores were not included in favor of the number of fascist neighbors. Including both of these variables would have created 
severe multicollinearity issues. A similar issue was found with the German iron production variable and US industrial production, which showed a 
correlation of 0.75. In this instance, the German number was included as a better representative of the regional economy. 
31 Two additional IV robustness tests, not shown here, were also run: an IV Poisson using a count function rather than a GMM estimator, and a 
plain IV-GMM estimation (using ivreg2 in Stata). Both of these tests conﬁrmed the endogeneity of the PPI and the suitability of the instruments; 
indeed, the IV-GMM estimation showed a much stronger correlation between the PPI and the regime value in Poland, but this may have been due 
to the estimator not taking into account the slow-moving nature of the regime value indicator. 
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Table 11 
IV poisson GMM robustness tests. 
1 2 3 4 
Producer Price Index − 0.0004 
8.53 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
PLN/USD Exchange Rate − 0.21 
7.77 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Policy Stance 
(monthly) 
1.11 
4.22 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Policy Stance 
(quarterly) 
2.24 
5.49 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Monetary Regime Dummy − 0.99 − 1.38 
5.38 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.01 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Coal Production − 1.04 
2.40 ∗ ∗ 
Gold Standard Dummy − 0.33 − 1.06 − 0.72 
4.32 ∗ ∗ ∗ 17.23 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.76 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Party Fractionalization 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.12 
6.92 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.20 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.09 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.73 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Emigration 1.40 − 1.69 0.48 2.51 
9.17 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.41 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.93 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.60 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Fiscal capacity 0.48 0.42 
6.78 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.29 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Fascist Transitions − 0.06 0.17 0.58 
1.70 ∗ 4.32 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.66 ∗ 
Fascist neighbours − 0.16 − 0.29 0.59 
6.41 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.06 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.66 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
US Inﬂation ( − 1) 1.24 1.75 
3.55 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.47 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
German Iron Production 
( − 1) 
− 1.04 
9.85 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
German PPI ( − 1) − 0.04 
2.15 ∗ ∗ 
War 0.34 0.40 
2.63 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.71 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
C − 2.35 41.21 − 4.31 
2.70 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.99 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.34 ∗ ∗ 
n 226 226 227 227 
instruments Regime dummy, German 
PPI, Export volumes, 
Political turnover, Coal 
production, 
Unemployment, Dow 
Jones returns 
lags 2–4 of exchange rate, 
regime dummy, German 
PPI, Political turnover, 
Dow Jones returns, war, 
Export volumes, Coal 
production 
Political turnover, 
Unemployment, Gold 
standard dummy, Export 
volumes, Dow Jones 
returns, Fiscal capacity, 
US inﬂation, Coal 
production, German iron 
production, Fascist 
transitions, Fascist 
neighbours, German PPI, 
war 
Regime dummy, Political 
turnover, Unemployment, 
Gold standard dummy, 
Export volumes, Dow 
Jones returns, Fiscal 
capacity, US inﬂation 
Hansen overid p- value 0.4392 0.4617 0.2629 0.3975 
Absolute value of t -statistics under coeﬃcients. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , and ∗ ∗ ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 controls should be treated with caution. Regardless, the overall picture regarding the eﬀects of monetary policy —our variables of
interest —appears to be consistent. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the role of monetary policy in undermining the rule of law in interwar Poland. Using a newly-compiled
dataset of historical statistics and drawing on brand new data on political institutions, the econometric models utilized demonstrated 
a strong correlation between proﬂigate monetary policies in the Second Republic and the decline in rule of law. This result was60 
C.A. Hartwell Explorations in Economic History 68 (2018) 37–70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 robust to several alternate speciﬁcations and variables, correcting for the properties of the data and the diﬀerent regimes that Polish
monetary policy passed through between the two World Wars. It appears that the massive growth in the supply of money during the
Second Republic’s early years, coupled with later bursts of inﬂation, contributed to the degradation of the rule of law. 
These relationships, while strong signiﬁcantly, must be treated with caution, mainly due to the varying size of their economic
eﬀects, dependent upon the proxy for monetary policy utilized. We are not able to conclusively prove via an econometric exercise if
there was a direct causal eﬀect between Poland’s monetary policies in the early 1920s and its descent into authoritarianism in the late
1930s; however, a reading of the historical record shows that this is in fact a plausible theory, and the econometric exercise contained
here does appear to suggest a link (especially as we control for other plausible variables such as fascist transitions in neighbours or
the presence of conﬂict). But given the multifaceted nature of the rule of law, and our nascent understanding of what drives it, it is
diﬃcult to point to monetary policy as the only determining factor in Poland’s case. I believe that it was a major factor, but other
aspects of national character, Poland’s historical experience, and the eﬀects of Partition may also have contributed. 
Nonetheless, this research opens the door for a whole new avenue of exploration in economics, namely tying the development
of macroeconomic indicators to institutional development instead of assuming institutions as either a given (a result of historical
accidents) or as unilaterally aﬀecting economic outcomes. Most importantly, this work has shown the importance of applying a much
longer lens to macroeconomics, noting that every institution is in some way shaped by macroeconomic priors, even as they are
shaping macroeconomic futures. 
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Appendix A. The maxrange coding scale. 
Regime Value Corresponding regime type 
1 Absolute Governance 
2 Absolute Monarchy 
3 Parliamentary Absolute Presidentialism 
4 Parliamentary Absolute Monarchy 
5 Semi-Authoritarian Despotic Presidentialism 
6 Genuine Military Junta 
7 Institutionalized Military Junta 
8 Enforced Absolutism 
9 State of Martial Law 
10 Absolute Colonialism 
11 Hierarchical Parliamentary Military 
12 Authoritarian Hierarchical Presidentialism 
13 Authoritarian Hierarchical Semi-Presidential 
14 Authoritarian Hierarchical Secretary General 
15 Semi-Anarchism 
16 Centralized Aristocratic Monarchism 
17 Authoritarian Hierarchical Monarchism 
18 De Facto Authoritarian Hierarchical Presidentialism 
19 Authoritarian Dominating Presidentialism 
20 Authoritarian Dominating Secretary General 
21 Authoritarian Directorate 
22 Authoritarian Hierarchical Non-Partyism 
23 Institutionalized Colonialism 
24 De Facto Authoritarian Dominating Presidentialism 
25 Decentralized Aristocratic Monarchism 
26 Semi-Authoritarian Hierarchical Presidentialism 
27 Authoritarian Delegated Monarch 
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28 Authoritarian Strong Presidentialism 
29 Semi-Constitutional Centralized Military Interim Regime 
30 Authoritarian Selected Presidentialism 
31 De Facto Authoritarian Strong Presidentialism 
32 Semi-Authoritarian Dominating Presidentialism 
33 Semi-Authoritarian Dominating Semi-Presidentialism 
34 Parliamentary Strong Military 
35 Parliamentary Colonialism 
36 Authoritarian Dominating Monarchism 
37 Semi-Authoritarian Dominating Semi-Presidentialism 
38 Semi-Authoritarian Strong Presidentialism 
39 Authoritarian Decentralized Presidentialism 
40 Authoritarian Decentralized Parliamentarism 
41 False Democratic Hierarchical Presidentialism 
42 Semi-Authoritarian Delegated Monarchy 
43 De Facto Authoritarian Presidentialism 
44 Illegitimate False Democratic Strong Monarchism 
45 Semi-Democratic Parliamentary Military Regime 
46 Illegitimate Dominating Semi-Authoritarian Regime 
47 Constitutional Military Interim Regime 
48 De Facto Authoritarian Semi-Presidentialism 
49 Semi-Authoritarian Presidentialism 
50 False Authoritarian Presidential Minority Government 
51 Semi-Authoritarian Semi-Presidentialism 
52 Semi-Authoritarian Presidential Parliamentarism 
53 False Democratic Strong Monarchism 
54 Illegitimate Hierarchical Parliamentarism 
55 False Democratic Dominating Parliamentarism 
56 Illegitimate False Democratic Monarchism 
57 False Authoritarian Presidential Majority Government 
58 Reformed Regime-Based Interim 
59 Autonomous Colonialism 
60 Hierarchical Democratic Presidentialism 
61 Reconstructed Regime-Based Interim 
62 Hierarchical Democratic Parliamentarism 
63 False Democratic Strong Presidentialism 
64 False Democratic Monarchism 
65 Transitional Centralized Interim 
66 Dominating Interim Presidentialism 
67 Dominating Democratic Parliamentarism 
68 False Democratic Presidentialism 
69 False Democratic Semi-Presidentialism 
70 False Democratic Strong Monarchical Parliamentarism 
71 False Democratic Presidential-Parliamentarian 
72 Transitional Interim Coalition 
73 Constitutional Interim Coalition 
74 Semi-Democratic Presidentialism 
75 Strong Monarchial Parliamentarism 
76 Interim Parliamentarism 
77 Elected Interim Parliamentarian 
78 False democratic Semi-Parliamentarism 
79 Democratic Strong Presidentialism 
80 Electoral democratic Presidentialism 
81 Provisional Presidentialism 
82 Electoral democratic Semi-Presidentialism 
83 Democratic Monarchical Parliamentarism 
84 Electoral Democratic Presidential Parliamentarism 
85 Intermediate Elected Interim 
86 Semi-Democratic Parliamentarism 
87 Democratic Constitutional Executive 
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 Regime Value Corresponding regime type 
88 Democratic Council Parliamentarian 
89 Qualiﬁed Democratic Indirect Presidentialism 
90 Extra-Parliamentarian Interim 
91 Qualiﬁed Democratic Presidentialism 
92 Qualiﬁed Democratic Accountable Presidentialism 
93 Qualiﬁed Democratic Included Territory 
94 Qualiﬁed Democratic Indirect Parliamentarian Presidentialism 
95 Qualiﬁed Democratic Indirect Semi-Presidentialism 
96 Qualiﬁed Democratic Parliamentarian Presidentialism 
97 Qualiﬁed Democratic Semi-Presidentialism 
98 Qualiﬁed Democratic Divided Executive 
99 Qualiﬁed Democratic Presidential Parliamentarism 
100 Qualiﬁed Democratic Parliamentarism 
Appendix B. Persistence of the eﬀect of ppi on rule of law 
As noted in the text (and as suggested by a helpful reviewer), the inﬂuence of monetary policy may have been stronger at deeper
lags than the one month shown in the baseline equation. Using the full model of Column 10 in Table 3 , I continuously increased the
lags of the PPI by one to test both the persistence of the eﬀect and its statistical signiﬁcance. As can be seen from the table below,
changes in Poland’s PPI in the interwar period has consistent and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the rule of law, peaking in months 4 through
6, and diminishing in eﬀect thereafter. However, the signiﬁcance of the eﬀect remains until month 43, meaning that monetary policy
shocks can persist for over three and a half years in this sample. 
Lag Coeﬃcient t-stat 
1 − 0.0002 4.48 
2 − 0.0002 5.32 
3 − 0.0002 6.12 
4 − 0.0004 8.11 
5 − 0.0004 8.41 
6 − 0.0004 8.20 
7 − 0.0003 6.58 
8 − 0.0002 5.34 
9 − 0.0002 4.42 
10 − 0.0001 3.80 
11 − 0.0001 3.20 
12 − 0.0001 2.76 
13 − 0.0001 2.33 
14 − 0.0001 2.66 
15 − 0.0001 2.43 
16 − 0.0001 2.43 
17 − 0.0001 2.43 
18 − 0.0001 2.55 
19 − 0.0001 2.83 
20 − 0.0001 3.02 
21 − 0.0001 2.85 
22 − 0.0001 3.53 
23 − 0.0001 3.77 
24 − 0.0001 4.16 
25 − 0.0001 4.67 
26 − 0.0001 5.32 
27 − 0.0001 6.16 
28 − 0.0001 7.35 
29 − 0.0001 8.87 
30 − 0.0001 8.78 
31 − 0.0001 8.06 
32 − 0.0001 7.15 
33 − 0.0001 6.34 
34 − 0.0001 5.71 
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 Lag Coeﬃcient t-stat 
35 − 0.0001 5.09 
36 − 0.0001 4.60 
37 − 0.0001 4.11 
38 − 0.0001 3.61 
39 − 0.0001 3.15 
40 − 0.0001 2.70 
41 − 0.0001 2.27 
42 − 0.00005 1.81 
43 − 0.00004 1.26 
Appendix C. Sign-restricted VAR results 
As noted in the main text, Uhlig (2005) lays out what has become the canonical approach towards understanding the relationship
between monetary policy and various macroeconomic outcome variables. Starting from the assumption that most modeling regarding 
monetary policy tend to embody priors, with the eﬀects already narrowed down by “a priori theorizing ” ( Uhlig 2005 :384), Uhlig uses
a Bayesian approach in a VAR framework to derive the impact of shocks with as little use of theorizing as possible in reference to the
variable of interest . In practice, this means that the response of the outcome variable (in Uhlig’s paper, output) is unrestricted (where
the agnosticism comes in), but the shocks are sign-restricted to evaluate the response of the outcome to various shocks (where theory
is introduced). As Uhlig (2005 :384) notes, “one can think about the procedure as identifying all shocks which are consistent with
these fairly weak a priori restrictions. ”
While such an approach may be inappropriate for the reasons mentioned in the main text, in the interest of advancing our
knowledge in the use of VARs with institutional outcome variables, I perform two separate VAR examinations here under Uhlig’s
framework using rule of law rather than other macroeconomic indicators: 
• A Bayesian “pure-sign-restricted VAR ” similar to that of Uhlig (2005) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008) ; and 
• A Bayesian “penalty function ” VAR, as used by Uhlig (2005) . 
As with Uhlig, the VAR is structured without a constant or time trend, and follows the form: 
𝑌 𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑌 𝑡 −1 + 𝛽2 𝑌 𝑡 −2 + …+ 𝛽𝑛 𝑌 𝑡 − 𝑛 + 𝛿1 𝑋 𝑡 −1 + …+ 𝛿𝑛 𝑋 𝑡 − 𝑛 + 𝜇𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1 , . . ., 𝑇 . (1)
Where Y is an m x 1 matrix of the rule of law, X is a similar matrix of the particular proxy for monetary policy, and u is the one-step
ahead prediction error. The impulse response vector a shows a response over the time horizon k as: 
𝑟 𝑎 ( 𝑘 ) = 
𝑚 ∑
𝑖 =1 
𝛼𝑟 𝑖 ( 𝑘 ) (2) -6
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Fig. C1. Impulse response, regime value to PPI shock, 6 lags (pure sign-restriction). 
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Fig. C2. Impulse response, regime value to PPI shock, 6 lags (penalty approach). 
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Fig. C3. Variance decomposition, 6 lags (pure sign-restriction), PPI shock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The sign restriction enters in as an inequality on 𝛼, restricting it to half the space of the entire impulse vector. The implementation
of this approach can be done in one of two ways. First, the pure sign-restriction approach relies on a Bayesian prior (an extended
Normal–Wishart prior, as per Zellner (1971) and posterior to discard impulse responses which do not comport with the sign restriction
over a predetermined set of draws. The second approach is by using a penalty function, which keeps all draws but assigns a penalty
to those which violate the sign restriction and a reward to those which satisfy it. As Uhlig (2005 :391) notes, 
The penalty-function approach delivers impulse response functions with small standard errors as it seeks to go as far as possible
in imposing certain sign restrictions. The penalty-function approach leaves the reduced-form VAR untouched, while the pure-sign- 
restriction is, in eﬀect, simultaneously an estimation of the reduced-form VAR alongside the impulse vector: VAR parameter draws,
which do not permit any impulse vector to satisfy the imposed sign restrictions, receive zero prior weight, and VAR parameter draws,
which easily permit satisfaction of the sign restrictions, receive more weight. 65 
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Fig. C4. Variance decomposition, 6 lags (penalty approach), PPI shock. 
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Fig. C5. Impulse response, regime value to monetary policy (quarterly) shock, 6 lags (pure sign-restriction). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 For this exercise, the number of draws has been set at 10,000. Finally, the lag length for this exercise is determined through
minimization of the usual information criteria. 
Using an agnostic approach, the results of the VAR tests are shown in Figs. C1–C4 for our main proxy for monetary policy, the
(diﬀerence of the) PPI versus the (diﬀerence of the) rule of law variable. Using the Akaike, Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn criteria, as well
as in the sequential modiﬁed LR test statistic and the ﬁnal prediction error test, a lag length of 6 was used as optimal. In each case,
the eﬀect of a positive shock to Poland’s PPI results in erratic eﬀects on the rule of law, but with a mostly statistically insigniﬁcant
eﬀect (as evidenced by the large conﬁdence bounds) apart from a negative eﬀect in the third month following the shock ( Fig. C1 ).
The penalty approach ( Fig. C2 ) appears to have tighter conﬁdence bounds, suggesting an overall negative eﬀect of monetary policy
on rule of law during periods 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7, but even this eﬀect is counterbalanced by signiﬁcant positive eﬀects in periods 4, 6, 8,
and 9. 66 
C.A. Hartwell Explorations in Economic History 68 (2018) 37–70 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Impulse response of Regime Value to Monetary Policy Tightening (Quarterly)
Fig. C6. Impulse response, regime value to monetary policy (quarterly) shock, 6 lags (penalty approach). 
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Fig. C7. Variance decomposition, 6 lags (pure sign-restriction), MP quarterly shock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The variance decomposition between the two approaches also is highly variable depending upon the monetary shock, with 
Fig. C3 showing that the shock in the pure sign-restriction approach explains 51% of the variance, while in the penalty approach
( Fig. C4 ), the eﬀect reaches 22% at its highest. 
As a monetary policy proxy, PPI works well for capturing the lag in monetary policy changes and how these shocks are actu-
ally transmitted through the economy. However, as noted in the text, we also have more immediate proxies for monetary policy
changes —the dichotomous variable on monetary policy stance measured over the quarter. Bearing in mind that a positive shock to
this variable would be a tightening of monetary policy, the results of the impulse responses for the monetary policy stance are shown
in Fig. C5 (pure sign-restriction) and C6 (penalty approach). Much like the PPI variable, the monetary policy variable is erratic and
entirely insigniﬁcant in the pure sign-restriction approach, while the penalty approach shows a signiﬁcant positive response in period
7, a negative response in period 8, and a positive response again in period 12. Also similar to the PPI VARs, the variance decompo-
sition varies widely depending upon the approach used, with the pure sign-restriction approach covering 45% of the variance in the
rule of law variable, but the penalty approach only showing 5% of variance in rule of law due to monetary policy. 67 
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Fig. C8. Variance decomposition, 6 lags (penalty approach), MP quarterly shock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The erratic nature of these results, coupled with the strong responses shown in the main text when a structural equation is used,
lead to a preference for the structural modeling rather than a purely agnostic approach. Indeed, these results show the danger of
modeling institutional eﬀects using only prior information on a particular institution, especially one in an environment where the 
entire institutional system is changing; failing to take into account this institutional environment and operating without relevant 
economic theory about the drivers of a particular institution can lead to erroneous assumptions about dynamic relationships in the
future. 
Supplementary materials 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.eeh.2018.03.001 . 
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